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The Russian Federation set very ambitious targets for privatization aimed at privatizing some 75-80 
percent of their state owned enterprises (SOEs) by 1996.  Because of the relatively few private 
financial assets available, the apparent limited interest, or the hesitancy of foreign investors, the sale 
of SOEs in 1991 proceeded very slowly.  In that year only 70 enterprises were transferred into a 
private hands (Chubais 1992).  In the nine months of 1992, only twelve thousand establishments, 
mainly very small ones, out of all 215 thousand SOEs, were privatized.  This constitutes a mere five 
percent of the SOEs designated for privatization (Statisticheskij 1992). 
 
At the same time, the parliamentary opposition to privatization grew putting into question the 
success of the whole operation.  The need for creating strong social support was very urgent. 
 
The group of young economists surrounding Anatolij Chubais in the State Committee for State 
Property Management (later called GKI, after Russian acronym GossKomImmushchestvo) decided 
that the speed of privatization, the transfer of the largest amount of property rights from the state 
sector to private owners, was much more important than the quality of this process.  This speed was 
expected to increase the political support for privatization and reform in general.1 
 
The program which provided the best opportunity for meeting this goal was the Voucher 
Privatization Program (VPP).  The Russian VPP was launched on October 1, 1992 by the Decree of 
the President of the Russian Federation (Ukaz 1992).  As well as achieving this political goal, it was 
assumed that the VPP would fulfill these additional goals: 
 
First, vouchers would generate a demand for shares in the privatized enterprises.  The population's 
savings was far too low to buy more than a fraction of state-owned assets, even at the residual 
value.  The capacity of Russia's nascent private business to acquire privatized enterprises was also 
limited, while the prospects for large-scale foreign participation were low because of the lack of 
political stability and unclear legal environment surrounding foreign direct investment in Russia.  
Thus vouchers, it was expected, would create an additional demand for state property. 
 
                     
1 There is no doubt that the main aim of the Russian VPP was first political and then economic. The first 
sentence of the President's Decree stressed that the issuance of a system of privatization vouchers was aimed 
at gaining support of a broad stratum of the population for privatization and reform in general (Ukaz 914, 
1992:1). The Economist in 1992 mentioned that "opinion polls indicate that privatization is now the only 
popular part of Mr. Yeltsin's program... may seem the only way of regaining support" (Russian 1992:44). Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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Second, it was assumed that vouchers would ensure fairness of privatization.  All Russian citizens, 
not just enterprise workers and managers, old nomenclatura, or those who have money thanks to 
illegal operations should benefit from privatization.   
 
Third, it was assumed that the VPP would create a new economy with entrepreneurial owners and 
efficient enterprises. 
 
The preparation of the VPP required the creation of a supply of shares, a demand for shares and 
distribution methods for shares.  The supply side required the prior corporatization of enterprises 
designated for the program, the adaptation of simplified business evaluation methods (usually the 
book value method), issuance of shares, and the preparation of simplified financial information for 
potential investors.  The demand side required the distribution of vouchers to citizens.  The 
distribution mechanism assumed the creation of voucher auctions designed to distribute shares 
among voucher holders, as well as an active involvement by intermediary financial institutions. 
 
This paper's authors attempt to summarize the experience of the Russian VPP three months before 
the program ended.  They attempt to analyze the degree of the program's success, and focus on the 
balance between the demand for shares and the supply of shares.  Therefore, three sides of the 
program are discussed here.  First, how large was the demand for shares expressed in vouchers 
(demand side); second, how many shares are available (supply side);  and third, what type of 
distribution mechanism was applied to accommodate both the supply of shares and the demand for 
shares expressed in the vouchers.  Two types of markets are analyzed: the market for vouchers and 
the market for shares.  A discussion follows as to what extent the supply of shares meets the 
demand for shares.  The analysis is conducted in dynamic and geographical dimensions. 
 
 
ROUNDS OF VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION 
 
The main political problem faced by architects of the Russian VPP was the question of satisfying 
the interests of all partners taking part in privatization: employees, management, citizens and 
potential strategic investors.  Therefore, a very rigid  procedure of shares distribution was 
introduced in the program.  This procedure assumed three rounds: closed subscription round, 
voucher auctions round and investment tenders round. 
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First Closed Subscription Round 
 
In the first round, the interests of managers and employees are secured.  In this round the internal 
(within the firm) distribution of vouchers takes place.  Two privatization variants are utilized.2 
 
In the first variant, 25 percent of the shares of newly commercialized firms are given to employees 
as preferred stock for free.  These are non-voting shares, but they give their holders priority to 
dividend distribution.  A limitation, however, applies here: the total number of shares distributed 
free to employees cannot be higher than 20 times the legally guaranteed monthly minimum wage 
per employee.  In November 1992 it amounted to 20 thousand rubles, in other words, 20 shares per 
employee. 
 
In addition to the 25 percent of free distributed shares in this variant, a further 10 percent of shares 
can be sold to employees at a 30 percent discount of the face value.  This way the employees can 
acquire 10 percent of all shares by paying only 70 percent of their issue value in the ratio of about 
13 shares for one voucher.  An additional limit applies, however.  Employees cannot purchase more 
than six times the minimum legally guaranteed monthly wage which in November 1992, when data 
were collected, amounted to 1000 rubles.  In other words, each employee  can realistically acquire 
for his vouchers six shares for a total 6,000 rubles.   
 
Furthermore, in this round management has the right to acquire up to 5 percent of the shares in the 
ratio of one voucher for ten shares.   
 
In the second variant employees and managers can acquire 51 percent of all shares within the 
framework of the closed subscription of shares.  The work force can buy these shares at the price of 
1.7 times the nominal value per share.  An approval by 2/3 of the employees is required.  There are 
no free shares under this option, no preferential discount is possible, and participants must, 
according to Russian law, pay with vouchers for 50 percent of their shares (100% payment in 
vouchers is encouraged).  Additionally, to make the whole process more difficult, the entire 
payment must be made within 90 days.3 
                     
2 In the Russian privatization program a third variant is apparent, reminiscent of the Polish privatization 
procedure combined with restructuring. The management group signs a contract with the local division of 
GKI for the enterprise restructuring and the preparation for privatization. Because only 1.5 percent of the 
firms adopted this variant and because it plays a marginal role in the VVP, it is not discussed here 
(Jermakowicz, Pañków 1993:97)  
3 The architects of the Russian VPP wanted to introduce the first privatization variant as exclusive for all 
enterprises. The second and the third variants (not discussed here) were introduced under the political 
pressure of employee and management lobbies in the Russian Parliament. To limit choice only to the first 
variant, some obstructions were introduced to eliminate other variants.  The 2/3 vote and 90 days payment 
are some of them. Approximately 77 percent of the Russian firms, however, have chosen the second 
privatization variant which gives employees and directors controlling stock in their companies.  Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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Summing up, in the first round either 40 percent (first variant) or 51 percent (second variant) of the 
shares is distributed in closed subscriptions among employees and management.  The degree to 
which this limit is met illustrates, in an indirect way, the confidence that employees display in the 
enterprise.  It can also serve as information for potential investors about the firm's condition; the 
investment activity of managers can be especially instructive. 
 
Second Voucher Auctions Round 
 
In the second round, shares unsold in the first step are sold at organized auctions where voucher 
holders (individuals, mutual funds, or venture capital companies) purchase them at market price.4  
The voucher auctions are organized by local State Property Funds.   
 
The number of shares offered at auctions is determined as the difference between the total number 
of shares and the number of shares distributed at closed subscriptions.  Additionally, a minimum 20 
percent of shares must be distributed for cash among strategic investors (to finance the whole 
operation)   Therefore, not all of the issued shares can be available at the organized exchanges 
(voucher auctions).  Because 25 percent of the shares are divided among employees and 20 percent 
should be designated for the third round, 55 percent of the remaining shares is the most that can be 
distributed through voucher auctions in the first variant, if employees and management decline the 
option to acquire the 15 percent of their reserved shares.  In the second variant, after distributing 51 
percent in the first round, no more than 29 percent of shares may be available to the outside 
investors.  During the two first rounds, however, no more than 80 percent of all shares can be sold. 
 
Third Investment Tenders Round 
 
In the third round, shares unsold at the auctions can be sold though direct sale to potential strategic 
investors.  Decisions about who can acquire these shares are made by the Privatization Funds and 
by firm management.  It is assumed that only 20 percent of these shares can be sold this way and 
exclusively for cash. 
 
Summing up, in the first round between 25(1st variant) and 51(2nd variant) percent of the shares 
were distributed.  In the second round, through voucher auctions, between 55 (1st variant) and 29 
(2nd variant) percent of the shares can be sold.  Finally, in the third round, approximately 20 
percent of the remaining shares can be sold to strategic investors.  The vouchers could be used in 
the first round within the framework of closed subscription, as well as in the second round, i.e.  the 
                     
4  Russian authorities stepped up the pace of voucher privatization with sales of shares in the historic GUM 
department store on the Red Square and factories in the industrial city of Volgograd.  Russia's most famous 
store attracted 6 thousand investors holding more than 100,000 privatization vouchers (Russia 1993). Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
5 
round of voucher auctions.  To encourage the maximum usage of vouchers during the first two 




CREATION OF THE SUPPLY OF SHARES (Assumptions and reality) 
 
The Russian voucher program encompasses rather large enterprises.  These are SOEs which, 
according to the Presidential Decree No.  721 issued on July 1, 1992, were chosen to be 
commercialized and then assigned to the Voucher Privatization Program.  The target group covered 
4,948 enterprises or 2.25 percent of all SOEs (Svobodnyje 1992).  The capital stock of these 
enterprises amounted to 518.5 billion rubles, which constituted approximately 50 percent of state 
assets in large firms or approximately 15 percent of all state assets.  The average capital amounted 
to 104.8 million rubles with an average number of 2,835 employees per firm. 
 
Each SOE that expected to be privatized was required to present its own basic privatization 
program.  Potential private buyers were also allowed to present competitive privatization programs.  
Both basic and competitive programs proposed what portion of the shares would be devoted for 
each of the three rounds (for employees and management, for voucher auction, and for direct sale). 
 
The aggregated basic information about the firms designated for privatization is presented on the 
left side of Table 1 (Data according to Decree 721). 
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Table  1  FIRMS DESIGNATED FOR VPP (Decree 721) AND FIRMS PRIVATIZED 
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF VP  (Data from March 4, 1994, in billion rubles). 
 
  Firms Designated for VPP.  Firms Privatized through VP  %  % 
Region  No.  of  Found.  Aver.  No.  of  Found.  Aver.  Firms  Found. 
  Firms Capital  Capital  Firms Capital  Capital    Capital 
Northern 313  38.8  0.124 640 25.9 0.040  204.5% 66.7%
No.West. 124  10.7  0.086 696 23.2 0.033  561.3% 217.0%
Central 1510  80.1  0.053 1744 75.5 0.043  115.5% 94.4%
Volga V.  305  25.1  0.082 567 28.9 0.051  185.9% 115.1%
C.  Chern  293  25.2  0.086 782 20.5 0.026  266.9% 81.2%
Volga 461  50.9  0.110 804 62.6 0.078  174.4% 122.9%
No.Cauc 270  25.7  0.095 931 23.5 0.025  344.8% 91.5%
Ural 480  115.9  0.242 728 91.3 0.125  151.7% 78.8%
W.  Siberia  648  63.7  0.098 1114 78.6 0.071  171.9% 123.4%
E.  Siberia  216  41.3  0.191 784 35.6 0.045  363.0% 86.2%
Far East  246  36.6  0.149 506 22.3 0.044  205.7% 61.0%
Kalin. 82  4.4  0.054 61 1.1 0.017    74.4% 24.0%
Total    4948  518.5  0.105  9357  489.0  0.052  189.1%  94.3% 
* Own calculations based on:  Summarnaja (1994). 
 
The results from Table 1 show that the largest number of shares of privatized firms have been 
issued by firms located in the Ural region, the next largest in the Central and the East Siberia 
regions, with the smallest number in the Pribaltica (Kaliningrad) and the North Western regions.  
The highest average capital engaged in one firm was in the Ural region - 241.5 million Rb.  per 
firm;  the East Siberia region - 191.4 million Rb.;  and in the Far East - 149 million Rb.;  with the 
lowest in the Kaliningrad region - 54 million Rb.;  and in the Central region - 53 million Rb. 
 
The results of voucher privatization surpassed even the most optimistic expectations.  During the 16 
months from December 1992 to March 1994, 9,342 firms were sold, 89 percent more than the plan 
assumed.  The total capital of privatized firms amounted to 489 billion Rb, or 94 percent of the 
capital of firms designated for privatization. 
 
The absolute record holder, both in the number of privatized firms in relation to those designated 
for privatization and in the size of privatized capital, appeared to be the North-Western Region.  In 
this region five and half times more firms were privatized than was planned, and the founding 
capital transferred to private hands was twice the amount planned.  The real loser appeared again to Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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be the Kaliningrad region where only 74 percent of the enterprises was sold, representing one fourth 
of the total capital assumed for sale. 
 
In absolute numbers the largest number of enterprises was privatized in the Central and West 
Siberian regions; the most founding capital was transferred in the Ural region and in the Central 
region.  The Ural region also led in the average size of privatized firms. 
 
Generally speaking, it was the smaller firms which were privatized, with an average capital of 52.2 
million rubles per firm (50% of that planned) and an employment of 911 employees (37% of that 
planned).  Smaller firms seemed to be more attractive to potential investors and they attracted more 
buyers.  On the other hand, the managers of large firms seemed to be stronger in their defense 
against any privatization attempts.  They usually belonged to stronger ministries which succeeded 
in excluding entire branches from the privatization process.  The larger firms were also more 
successful in convincing the central bureaucracy that they needed some restructuring activities 
before they could go public.  On the whole, within the framework of the VPP, 47.2 percent of the 
capital of all firms designated for privatization (approximately 14 percent of all state assets) has 
been sold, which can be regarded as a success.   
 
 
DYNAMIC OF SHARE SALES  
 
The process of privatization of the large SOEs started in December 1992 when the first 18 firms 
were auctioned at voucher auctions.  Until the end of April 1993, the fast growth of privatized firms 
was visible.  In the second half of 1993 the process slowed (See Table 2).  A renewed acceleration, 
however, appeared in December 1993 when more than one thousand firms were privatized.  This 
seems to illustrate that the old Communist economy habit of accelerating production at the end of 
the year and slowing it at the beginning of the year, remains intact.  At the beginning of 1994, the 
number of privatized firms declined to 598. 
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TABLE 2.  DYNAMIC OF PRIVATIZATION AND BASIC DATA ON ENTERPRISES 
 
Date  No.  of  Found.  Aver.  Found.  %  Aver.  Employ.  Aver. 
 Firms  Capital 








Dec.  '92  18  3041  168.9 513 16.9% 28.50  42  2.33
Jan.  '93  107  6062  56.7 705 11.6% 6.59  189  1.77
Feb.  '93  194   6497  33.5 1489 22.9% 7.68  189  0.97
Mar.  '93  439  22554  51.4 5297 23.5% 12.07  532  1.21
Apr.  '93  613  30038  49.0 7016 23.4% 11.45  820  1.34
May  '93  581  23174  39.9 7482 19.3% 7.71  526  0.91
Jun.  '93  896  38502  43.0 8036 20.9% 8.97  793  0.89
Jul.  '93  911  35205  38.6 8180 23.2% 8.98  698  0.77
Aug.  '93  896  33514  37.4 6909 20.6% 7.71  754  0.84
Sep.  '93  776  35498  45.7 7192 20.3% 9.27  732  0.94
Oct.  '93  961  45142  47.0 8407 18.6% 8.75  878  0.91
Nov.  '93  883  46287  52.4 8474 18.3% 9.60  657  0.74
Dec.  '93  1058  50824  48.0 9919 19.5% 9.38  946  0.89
Jan.  '94  598  50234   84.0 11456 22.8% 19.16  476  0.80
Feb.  '94  411  60266  146.6 14296 23.7% 34.78  858  2.09
Total 9342  486838  52.1  102238  21.0%    9090  0.97 
* Own calculations based on: Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994). 
 
Another interesting phenomenon is the cyclical pattern in the development of the average size of 
the firms designated for voucher privatization.  The largest enterprises (measured by average capital 
as well as by average employment), were privatized at the beginning of the program (late '92 and 
early '93) and at the end of the program (first two months of 1994).  At the same time, there exists 
an inverse proportion:  the larger the number of firms auctioned, the smaller the firms.  For 
example, the largest number of firms were privatized in July and in December 1993, and it was in 
these two months that the average capital of firms was also the lowest. 
 
Generally speaking, the portion of shares designated for voucher auctions stabilized at the level of 
21 percent.  The deviations from this level, with exception of the first two months, are small and do 
not exceed 2.7 percent.  It is also interesting that the portion increased in the first month of 1994, as 
did the average size of the firms designated for privatization, which seems to indicate that the 
central authorities are willing to designate a larger number of shares for voucher auctions to meet 
the voucher demand before the program expires in middle of 1994. Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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CREATION OF THE DEMAND FOR SHARES 
 
Each of the citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of age, residence, place of employment, or 
level of income, had the right to acquire a voucher equal to the nominal value of ten thousand 
rubles against a 25 ruble fee (Ukaz 1992).  Vouchers began being issued on October 1, 1992, and 
the whole process was finished on March 31, 1993. 
 
Vouchers are bearer securities (not made out to a named person) entitling the holder to buy shares 
in joint stock companies (JSCs) undergoing privatization.  Vouchers are transferable and have a 
specified validity period.  They are not replaced if lost or stolen.  The government of Russia 
guarantees that vouchers issued in 1992 may be used to obtain shares of JSCs undergoing 
privatization or shares of voucher funds.  The government, however, does not guarantee a cash 
value for vouchers. 
 
The total number of vouchers issued by the State Committee was 151.1 million.  Approximately 
144 million citizens decided to acquire vouchers, which in itself is a success.  The remaining shares 
were either given to emerging pension funds or were distributed to citizens who lost their vouchers 
through fraud, or illegal investment funds which later disappeared.  Because each voucher had a 
value of 10,000 Rb., the purchasing power of all citizens was 1.51 trillion Rb. 
 
It was assumed that the second tranche of vouchers would be issued in 1993 and a third in 1994 
with a one year validity.  During the first year, however, it became apparent that there were more 
vouchers in circulation than assumed, and more shares were bought for cash than was anticipated, 
and that the supply of shares was lower than expected.  Therefore, the whole program was reduced 
only to a first tranche.  The validity of the vouchers from the first tranche was extended by about a 
half year until June 30, 1994 (Ukaz 914, Po³o¿enije "O priwatizacionnom..")  
 
In Table 3  the distribution of vouchers between different regions is presented. 
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TABLE 3.  THE NUMBER OF VOUCHERS DISTRIBUTED AMONG RUSSIAN CITIZENS IN 






North Western  8270.4  5.5%
Central    30383.3 20.1%
Volga Vyatka  8482.6 5.6%
Cent.  Chernoziem  7761.9 5.1%
Volga    16640.9 11.0%
North Caucasus  17245.6 11.4%
Ural 20430.5 13.5%
West Siberia  16888.5 11.2%
East Siberia  9474.8 6.3%
Far East  8445.6 5.6%
Kaliningrad 894.1 0.6%
Total 151109.3 100.0%
*  Own calculations based on Summarnaja (1994) 
 
The residents of the Central region comprised of:  Moscow, the Moscow oblast, Tula, Tver, 
Vladimir, and others received the most vouchers (20.%).  Next came Ural (13.5%), North Caucasus 
(11.4%) and Volga (11.0 %).  The residents of Pribaltica and Northern regions received the smallest 
number of vouchers (0.6 and 4.1% respectively).  It appears that the number of vouchers is closely 
correlated with the size of the population in each of the regions. 
 
A disproportion exists between the demand expressed in vouchers and the supply expressed in 
shares.  For example, in the Central region, there was a 4.7 percent surplus of vouchers in relation 
to shares (20.1% vs.  15.4%).  In the Ural region, there is quite the opposite, with the surplus of 
shares over vouchers amounting to 9.4 percent (13% vs.  22.4%).  This indicates the need for an 
integrated Federal voucher market and voucher auctions. 
 
Voucher distribution was a spectacular success for the privatization authorities in Russia.  The sale 
of 96 percent of the vouchers to the Russian citizens eligible to purchase them was a tremendous 
achievement impossible to match in other countries privatizing their economies.  In 
Czechoslovakia, for example, only 70 percent of the population acquired their vouchers (they were, 
however, more expensive). 
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DYNAMIC OF THE VOUCHER UTILIZATION PROCESS 
 
During the last sixteen months 489.1 million shares were sold, and about 77,549 thousand vouchers 
were used.  This constitutes a little more than 50 percent of all the vouchers in the circulation. 
 
TABLE  4.      THE STRUCTURE OF VOUCHER UTILIZATION BOTH IN CLOSED 
SUBSCRIPTION AND VOUCHER AUCTIONS (In thousand units) (Dynamic 
Aspect) 
 
Date  Closed Subscript.  Voucher auction  Total Used Vouchers  % 




Capital Accum. Dynam. 
% 
Used 
Nov.  '92  50    50 50    0.0%
Dec.  '92  158  316%  158 --  316 366  332%  0.2%
Jan.  '93  315  199%  229 145% 544 910  249%  0.6%
Feb.  '93  336  107%  544 238% 880 1,790  197%  1.2%
Mar.  '93  1,173  349%  2,268 417% 3,441 5,231  292%  3.5%
Apr.  '93  1,562  133%  4,217 186% 5,779 11,010  210%  7.3%
May  '93  1,205  77%  3,745 89% 4,950 15,960  145%  10.6%
Jun.  '93  2,002  166%  4,440 119% 6,442 22,402  140%  14.8%
Jul.  '93  1,830  91%  6,668 150% 8,498 30,900  138%  20.4%
Aug.  '93  1,743  95%  4,277 64% 6,020 36,920  119%  24.4%
Sep.  '93  1,845  106%  4,786 112% 6,631 43,551  118%  28.8%
Oct.  '93  2,347  127%  4,635 97% 6,982  50,533  116%  33.4%
Nov.  '93  2,406  103%  2,871 62% 5,277 55,810  110%  36.9%
Dec.  '93  2,642  110%  4,383 153% 7,025 62,835  113%  41.6%
Jan.  '94  2,612  99%  4,091 93% 6,703 69,538  111%  46.0%









   
*  Own calculations based on Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994) 
 
From all used vouchers, two-thirds were used within the framework of voucher auctions and one-
third within the framework of closed subscriptions.  If at the beginning there was a higher use of 
vouchers through closed subscriptions, then at the beginning of March 1993, an opposite process is 
present, with vouchers more often being used as means of payment at auctions, rather than for Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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internal closed subscriptions.  Another easily observable process is the slow down of voucher use in 
the second half of 1993.  From August 1993, the number of vouchers used stays practically at the 
same level, varying between 5.2 and 7.9 billion Rb.  per month. 
 
The distribution of voucher use in the different regions of Russia is also varied(See Table 5). 
 
TABLE  5.      THE STRUCTURE OF VOUCHER USE BOTH IN CLOSED SUBSCRIPTION 






Vouchers used during: 
Closed Subscriptions        Voucher Auctions 
Northern 4,108,159  66.4% 1,324,291 32.2%  2,783,868   67.8%
North Western  7,701,095  93.1% 1,316,278 17.1%  6,384,817 82.9%
Central    15,555,015  51.2% 3,653,105 23.5%  11,901,909 76.5%
Volga Vyatka  4,673,354  55.1% 1,692,906 36.2%  2,980,448 63.8%
Cent. Chernoziem  2,878,095  37.1% 1,094,510 38.0%  1,783,585 62.0%
Volga    7,515,159  45.2% 2,329,908 31.0%  5,185,252 69.0%
North Caucasus  4,492,518  26.1% 1,375,386 30.6%  3,117,132 69.4%
Ural 14,129,771  69.2% 5,606,662 39.7%  8,523,109 60.3%
West Siberia  8,791,109  52.1% 3,187,550 36.3%  5,603,559 63.7%
East Siberia  4,789,424  50.5% 2,437,258 50.8%  2,349,165 49.8%
Far East  2,616,983  31.0% 1,168,687 44.6%  1,448,296 55.3%
Kaliningrad 302,177  33.8%   87,110 28.8%  215,067 71.2%
Total 77,549,859  51.3% 25,273,652 32.5%  52,276,207 67.4%
* Own calculations based on Summarnaja (1994). 
 
The largest portion of vouchers were used in the North Western (93.1%), Northern (66.4%), and 
Ural (69.2%) regions.  Relatively, the lowest portion of vouchers were used in the peripherally 
located regions of Northern Caucasus, the Far East, and Kaliningrad, where until March 1994, 
fewer than one-third of all vouchers in circulation were used. 
 
Again two-thirds of the vouchers were used in the voucher auctions and one-third in closed 
subscriptions.  In different regions some differences are apparent.  A strong positive correlation 
exists between the degree of the use of vouchers and the share of vouchers used at voucher auctions 
(See Table 5).  This correlation is especially visible in the case of the North Western region.  In this 
region, 93 percent of all vouchers were used and they were mainly vouchers used through voucher 
auctions (82.9%).  The Far East region provides an example at the other extreme, where only 31 
percent of all the vouchers were used, and voucher auctions accumulated a little more than half of Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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the vouchers.  It is also interesting that in the eastern peripheries of the Federation, i.e.  in the East 
Siberian and the Far East regions, almost half of all the vouchers constitute vouchers used through 
closed subscription.  Apparently, in these regions, a smaller demand for vouchers exists.  This 
seems to be confirmed by the high purchasing power of each voucher at voucher auctions in these 
two regions (see Table 8).  Each voucher can purchase 3 and 2.5 shares respectively, exceeding the 
average for the entire Federation which is 1.96 shares per voucher. 
 
Only four months remain until the end of the VP program.  During this time, nearly half of all the 
vouchers remaining in circulation should be used.  The GKI expects that in this time the 
privatization of GASPROM and other refineries will bring a large number of shares to voucher 
exchanges (about 20% of all demand expressed in vouchers).  Nevertheless,  this indicates that at 
the current voucher exchange rate (less than 2 shares per voucher), approximately 20 percent of the 
vouchers will not find their shares, unless the program is expanded and new firms enter voucher 
privatization or a dramatic fall in voucher prices occurs. 
 
 
DYNAMIC OF VOUCHER PRICE FORMATION ON THE SECONDARY VOUCHER 
MARKET 
 
In the period from October 1, 1992 to March 31, 1993, 151.1 million vouchers were issued.  A 
voucher holder may use his voucher in one of three ways: to buy shares of privatized enterprises in 
auctions or tenders, to exchange it for shares in mutual funds, or to sell it for cash.5  Because of the 
last option, a secondary market for vouchers has emerged where vouchers can freely be sold or 
purchased.  Firms dealing in trading vouchers have emerged.  In Moscow the best know firms are 
KLIO, CERICH, OLIDA, LERMAN, and FIRSOV.  In other regions, REZERW PARTNER in 
Voronezh, DOCHODNYJE BUMAGI in Pskov, DOCHODNYJ DOM in Saratov, and TRAST 
INWEST in Chelabinsk are operating. 
 
The voucher price on the secondary market, on one hand, reflects the relation of supply and 
demand, and on the other hand, provides a rather precise reading of the political situation and 
atmosphere around privatization activities. 
 
The voucher prices in the discussed period are listed in Table 6. 
 
 
                     
5  A humorous example of vouchers application in real life is provided by the Russian daily Rossiiskiye 
Vestey. The daily reports that vouchers in the city of Perm are accepted by prostitutes as payment for their 
services ("Postscripts" 1993). Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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TABLE 6.  DYNAMIC OF VOUCHER PRICE FORMATION IN RUBLES AND IN USD. 
 
Date Average  Dynamic  Exchange  Average 
 price 
Rb 




Nov.  '92  8565 453 18.91
Dec.  '92  7447 86.95% 469 15.88
Jan.  '93   5027 67.50% 569 8.83
Feb.  '93  4600 91.51% 576 7.99
Mar.  '93  4164 90.52% 684 6.09
Apr.  '93  4284 102.88% 795 5.39
May  '93  5289 123.46% 940 5.63
Jun.  '93  8888 168.01% 1085 8.19
Jul.  '93  9088 102.27% 987 9.21
Aug.  '93  9567 105.27% 985 9.71
Sep.  '93  10134 105.93% 1299 7.80
Oct.  '93  11648 114.94% 1191 9.78
Nov.  '93  28672 246.15% 1214 23.62
Dec.  '93  26421 92.15% 1554 17.00
Jan.  '94  24762 93.72% 1587 15.60
Feb.  '94  22674 91.57% 1689 13.42
*  Own calculations based on Pribalow (1994) and D¹browski (1993) 
 
From October 1992 until spring 1994, three stages in the voucher price formation are clearly 
visible.  The first stage covers the time period from October 1, 1992 to March 1993.  In this time 
the voucher price shows a falling tendency, from 8,565 Rb.  in November 1992 to 4,164 Rb in 
March 1993.  This period was also characterized by high fluctuations in voucher prices.  For 
example, on December 6, 1992, the highest price was eight thousand Rb and the lowest six 
thousand Rb.  By the end of this stage the voucher price stabilized itself at the level of 4-4.2 
thousand rubles with minor fluctuations not exceeding 3 percent in April 1993.  The decline in the 
voucher prices was a result of political destabilization, changes in the government (Chernomyrdin 
replaced Gaidar), internal conflicts within the government, and strong opposition by the Russian 
Parliament to the privatization program. 
 
The second stage began in April 1993 and was characterized by the gradual (100-250 ruble daily) 
increase in nominal voucher prices.  If at the beginning of May 1993 this price was at the level of 
4,150 Rb., then in June 1994 it was 8.3-8.6 thousand Rb (on some stock exchanges prices reached Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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12 thousand rubles).  In November 1993 as a result of Yeltsin's power consolidation and his 
dissolution of Parliament, the voucher price increased suddenly to 28,672 Rb.  The boom of the 
second period was a result of the victorious referendum as well as the Presidential decree which set 
the mandatory minimum quota of shares designated for voucher auctions.  An agreement reached 
between the GKI and the Russian Ministry of Fuels and Energy concerning the sale of a portion of 
firms' shares for vouchers strengthened this process.   
 
The third period began in November 1993, and was characterized by a slow (about 50 rubles daily) 
decline in voucher prices.  At the end of February 1992, the voucher price fell to the level of 22,674 
Rb and showed continuing declining tendencies.  Had the November events consolidating Yeltsin's 
power not taken place, the voucher prices would very probably have reached an equilibrium price 
of 19 thousand Rb.  per voucher.  This is a price which is 1.9 times higher than the nominal voucher 
price, and amounts to a little over $13.00. 
 
The voucher price expressed in USD also fluctuated.  In the first and third stages, there is a visible 
decline in voucher price expressed in USD.  If in October 1992 the price of a voucher was $23, then 
at the end of this period, it was only $5.39.  In the second period, the price stabilized at the level of 
$8-9 per voucher.  In the third period, however, after a sudden increase to $23, the price again fell 
in February 1994 to $13.  Because of the expected immediate increase in the number of vouchers 
introduced into the voucher auctions.  maintaining the same number of firms designated for 
privatization, a dramatic decline in the average voucher price can be expected in May and June 
1994.  This decline was already visible in December 1993, when it was announced that voucher 
privatization would definitely end in mid-1994. 
 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF VOUCHERS AND THE 
NUMBER OF SHARES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROGRAM AND DURING ITS 
REALIZATION 
 
There is no doubt that the balance of demand for shares with their supply required a massive sale of 
privatized enterprises' shares for vouchers during 1993.  Experts from the State Committee were 
aware that a significant number of vouchers should be sold as early as the first half of 1993, well 
before the vouchers expiration, to create confidence in the VPP (Chubais 1992). 
 
Generally speaking, to create confidence in the program, a minimum of ten shares would be issued 
for each voucher.  In other words, the nominal value of the shares offered on the market would be 
equal or higher than the face value of the vouchers.  The relatively higher value of shares than 
vouchers creates a buffer and leads generally to higher confidence in the program.  And vice versa, Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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the shortage of shares could lead to voucher inflation and could undermine public confidence in the 
whole voucher privatization program.6 
 
How is equilibrium maintained in the Russian VPP?  To answer this question the authors compared 
the supply of shares with the demand for them.  An analysis of this question is made in accordance 
with the different regions and in relation to the conditions existing in each region.  The 
regionalization of analysis is understandable because the sales of shares takes place, with the 
exception of shares of very large enterprises, at regional voucher auctions. 
 
TABLE 7.  ESTIMATED VOUCHER EXCHANGE RATES AT BEGINNING OF THE 

























Northern 38789.1  31031.2 11248.8 6191.1 5.01  1.82
North Western  10692.4  8553.9 3100.8 8270.4 1.03  0.37
Central    80055.7  64044.6 23216.2 30383.3 2.11  0.76
Volga Vyatka  25104.1  20083.3 7280.2 8482.6 2.37  0.86
Cent.  Chernoziem  25225.7  20180.5 7315.4 7761.9 2.60  0.94
Volga    50938.3  40750.7 14772.1 16640.9 2.45  0.89
North Caucasus  25652.4  20521.9 7439.2 17245.6 1.19  0.43
Ural 115945.0  92756.0 33624.0 20430.5 4.54  1.65
West Siberia  63730.4  50984.3 18481.8 16888.5 3.02  1.09
East Siberia  41349.8  33079.9 11991.4 9474.8 3.49  1.27
Far East  36603.6  29282.9 10615.1 8445.6 3.47  1.26
Kaliningrad 4413.1  3530.5 1279.8 894.1 3.95  1.43
Total 518499.7  414799.8 150364.9 151109.3 2.75  1.00
*  Own calculations based on Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994). 
 
The simple comparison of value of shares and the nominal value of voucher shows a strong lack of 
balance.  The total number of shares, 518 million, exceeds the total amount of vouchers, 151.1 
million, by only three and half times, much below the required ten times. 
 
                     
6  To avoid such a situation, the designers of the Czechoslovak Privatization Program assumed in 1992 that 
the supply of shares would exceed 16 percent of the voucher demand. Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
17 
In reality the situation is more complicated.  Employees have the right to acquire 25 percent of the 
shares for free as well as purchase an additional 10 percent.  Also, managers can purchase, during 
closed subscription, an additional 5 percent of shares.  In extreme cases either  414.8 million of 
shares with the total value of 414.8 billion rubles, or 150.3 million of shares with the total value of 
150.3 billion Rb.  should be designated to the voucher auctions.  This depends on which variant 
would be fulfilled: optimistic or pessimistic.  In the optimistic variant, it is assumed that 80 percent 
of all shares will be sold for vouchers, as according to Presidential Decree 66, a minimum of 20 
percent of the shares has to be sold for cash.  In the pessimistic variant, it is assumed that 29 percent 
of shares could be sold for vouchers.  The minimal limit was set up by the Presidential Decree 
entitled:  "About the State Guaranties Securing the Citizens' Rights to the Participation in 
Privatization" (Ukaz 640).  These shares had to be provided for auctions within three months of the 
registration of a new joint-stock company (JSC).  In the case of the optimistic variant, an unrealistic 
assumption was also made that there is no distribution of shares for free, and that all shares (with 
the exception of these sold for cash in the third round) are designated for voucher auctions.   
 
The comparison of both variants shows that from the beginning a shortage of shares and a lack of 
nominal equilibrium were apparent.  It was impossible for one voucher with a nominal face value of 
10 thousand rubles to purchase ten shares at one thousand rubles each.  The shortage was between 1 
billion and 1.4 billion shares.  The program's architects assumed that for each voucher, on average, 
it would be possible to acquire 2.75 shares in the optimistic variant or 1 share in the pessimistic 
variant.  This was a rather risky assumption, because considering the lack of experience among 
Russian investors, the lack of equilibrium could lead to a dissatisfaction among voucher holders, 
stemming from the fact that their vouchers acquired less value than was promised. 
 
The second observation concerns the differences in exchange rates among regions.  The vouchers in 
the Northern and Ural regions achieved the highest coverage at 5.01 and 4.54, respectively.  The 
lowest rate was achieved in the North Western and North Caucasus regions, 1.03 and 1.19, 
respectively (in the optimistic variant). 
 
The reality, however, was different from the assumptions.  The average exchange rate calculated by 
dividing the value of the funding capital designated for vouchers auctions by the number of 
vouchers used on the voucher auctions, was lower than predicted in the optimistic variant, but 
higher than in the pessimistic variant.  It settled at an average point between the optimistic and 
pessimistic rate.  Of course, the question arises, that if only 21 percent of the shares were designated 
for auctions (8 percent lower than predicted in the pessimistic variant), how was such a high 
exchange rate achieved?  If on the supply side for auctions, only-one fifth of the planned shares 
were provided, then on the demand side in the auctions, only one-third of all vouchers were used.  
Some of the vouchers were used in closed subscriptions, and half of them are still in private hands. Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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The voucher exchange rates in different regions were quite the opposite than anticipated.  The 
Northern region, instead of having the highest exchange rates, appears to have a very low rate (1.6), 
well below the national average.  At the same time, the East Siberian and Far East regions which 
were supposed to have exchange rates slightly above average, finished as leaders, exceeding the 
national average by 50 percent.  Only the predictions about regions with lower than expected 
exchange rates appeared to be correct.  The North Western and North Caucasus regions have low 
rates of 1.0 and 1.7 shares per voucher respectively. 
 
Another interesting phenomenon was the smaller than anticipated difference between the highest 
and the lowest rate.  The difference between the extremes was expected to be about 1 to 5, between 
the North Western and Northern regions (.37:1.82).  The actual difference was smaller, 1:3, and it 
was between the North Eastern and East Siberian regions (1.0:3.0).  Apparently, in spite of 
distances and communication difficulties between regions, some integration between auction 
markets existed. 
 


















Northern 25,6531  4,442 17.4% 2,784  1.6
North Western  23,100  6,531 27.8% 6,385  1.0
Central    75,541  17,141 27.7% 11,902  1.4
Volga Vyatka  28,905  7,279 25.2% 2,980  2.4
Cent.  Chernoziem  20,280  4,342 21.4% 1,784  2.4
Volga    62,608  13,523 21.6% 5,185  2.6
North Caucasus  23,471  5,250 22.4% 3,117  1.7
Ural 91,391  18,541 20.3% 8,523  2.2
West Siberia  78,654  14,518 18.5% 5,604  2.6
East Siberia  35,628  7,105 19.9% 2,349  3.0
Far East  22,325  3,691 16.5% 1,448  2.5
Kaliningrad 1,061  246 23.2% 215  1.1
Total 488,626  102,508 21.0%   52,276  2.0
*  Own calculations based on Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994). 
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Undoubtedly, the voucher exchange rates together with the political situation had a decisive impact 
on the voucher prices in secondary markets (See Table 6).  Generally speaking, the positive 
correlations between voucher exchange rates and voucher prices are apparent.  A decline in the 
exchange rate from December 1992 to May 1993 creates a decline in voucher prices.  The boom in 
the voucher exchange rates in the second half of 1993 also had a positive impact on the average 
price of vouchers in secondary markets. 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES IN DIFFERENT ROUNDS OF VOUCHER 
PRIVATIZATION 
 
Distribution of shares in different rounds of VP gives an answer to who truly becomes an owner of 
state property.  In the calculations, the actual capital of the privatizing enterprises, in the amount of 
489,117 million rubles, was used.  The calculations are shown in Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9.  DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES IN DIFFERENT ROUNDS OF VOUCHER 
PRIVATIZATION (In Thousand of Rb.) 




















Northern  25870.5 2257.3 2185.1 7975.4 4442.0 9010.7
North  Western  23202.1 1108.0 2171.9 7857.2 6431.0 5634.1
Central    75540.7  5398.0 6027.6 24833.9 17141.0  22140.2
Volga  Vyatka  28905.1 2211.6 2793.3 8869.6 7279.0 7751.6
Cent.  Chernoziem  20583.1  896.9 1805.9 7177.1 4342.0  6361.2
Volga    62580.7  4711.9 3844.3 21482.5 13523.0  19019.0
North  Caucasus  23471.0 1229.6 2269.4 7767.0 5250.0 6954.9
Ural 91315.9  3860.3 9251.0 30720.3 18541.0  28943.3
West Siberia  78634.3  3304.4 5259.5 29180.6 14518.0  26371.8
East Siberia  35627.7  1337.5 4021.5 11742.3 7105.0  11421.4
Far East  22324.6  833.0 1928.3 7954.5 3691.0  7917.8
Kaliningrad 1061.3  44.5 143.7 321.1 246.0  305.9
Total 489117.0  25876.1 41701.5 167198.5 102509.0  151831.8
 100.0%  5.3% 8.5% 34.2% 21.0%  31.0%
*  Own calculations based on Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994). 
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In the first round only 5.3 percent of the shares were distributed free within the framework of the 
first variant due to the fact that only 21.3 percent of the firms chose this variant for privatization.  In 
the framework of the first round of closed subscriptions, 43 percent of all shares were sold with 80 
percent sold for rubles and only 20 percent sold for vouchers.  21 percent of the shares were sold at 
voucher auctions within the framework of the second round, with about 31 percent of all the shares 
destined for investment tenders (third round). 
 
A few interesting paradoxes are apparent from the Table. 
 
First, according to the Presidential Decree, a minimum of 50 percent of all shares should be sold 
within the framework of closed subscriptions in the first round for vouchers.  So far, only 20 
percent of all shares designated for closed subscription were sold for vouchers.  Again, this is about 
30 percent less than the above mentioned law requires. 
 
Second, according to the Presidential Decree (Ukaz 640), a minimum of 29 percent of all shares of 
firms designated for privatization should be designated for the VPP.  Table 9 seems to show that for 
vouchers at voucher auctions, only 21 percent of all shares were sold so far, 8 percent less than the 
Decree requires. 
 
Third, the purchase of vouchers for cash plays a more important role than was anticipated by the 
architects of the Russian privatization program.  A total of 65.2 percent of all shares were sold for 
cash.  This explains why so many of the issued decrees are aimed at forcing voucher holders to 
make purchases in vouchers, not in cash. 
 
The larger than expected role of cash undoubtedly had a positive impact on the slowing of 
inflationary tendencies in the Russian economy in the first half of 1993. 
 
Voucher auctions had the largest role in the North-Western region, where 27.7 percent of all 
vouchers were sold.  This was still 1.3 percent lower than the 29% required by law.  At the other 
extreme was the Far East  and Northern regions, with only 16.5% and 17.1%, respectively, of 
vouchers sold.  An inverse proportion exists between the portion designated for auctions and the 
number of shares sold for cash to strategic investors in the third round.  A game seems to be played 
by the management of privatized firms: to sell the largest portion of shares in the third round and 
the smallest in the second round.  In the third round the fictitious firms established by the directors 
and part of the employees as a rule won the tenders and thus increased the block of shares under the 
control of management and employees. 
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RESULTS OF VOUCHER AUCTIONS 
 
The successful introduction of the voucher privatization program required the preparation of en 
effective system of auctions and tenders, where vouchers are exchanged against shares of privatized 
JSCs.  Undoubtedly voucher auctions play an important role in the VPP as institutions of the 
primary market. 
 
From December 1992 to March 1994, more than 9 thousand auctions took place and they became a 
permanent element of the financial market.  The number of auctions according to regions is 
presented in Table 10. 
  
TABLE 10.   NUMBER OF VOUCHER AUCTIONS (In Thousand Rb.) (Data from March 4, 
1994) 
Date  No.  of  Num.  of   Regions  Found.  Found.  %  Vouch.  Vouch. 
 Auct.  Month  Total  Capital 







Dec.  '92  18  8  8 3041 513 16.9%  158 3.25
Jan.  '93  107  21  26 6062 705 11.6%  229 3.08
Feb.  '93  194  30  40  6497 1489 22.9%  544 2.74
Mar.  '93  439  51  57 22554 5297 23.5%  2268 2.34
Apr.  '93  613  61  69 30038 7016 23.4%  4217 1.66
May  '93  581  53  72 23174 7482 19.3%  3745 1.20
Jun.  '93  896  74  79 38502 8036 20.9%  4440 1.81
Jul.  '93  911  62  81 35205 8180 23.2%  6668 1.23
Aug.  '93  896  66  81 33514 6909 20.6%  4277 1.62
Sep.  '93  776  66  82 35498 7192 20.3%  4786 1.50
Oct.  '93  961  74  82 45142 8407 18.6%  4635 1.81
Nov.  '93  883  64  82 46287 8474 18.3%  2871 2.95
Dec.  '93  1058  64  82 50824 9919 19.5%  4383 2.26
Jan.  '94  598  63  83 50234 11456 22.8%  4091 3.00
Feb.  '94  411  50  86 60266 14296 23.7%  4920 2.71
Total 9342   486838 102238 21.0%  52232 1.96
*  Own calculations based on:  Rezultaty (1994). 
 
While in December 1992, only 18 voucher auctions were organized, in January 105 auctions took 
place, in February 200, in April 600, and in December 1993 approximately 1000.  At the same time, 
the number of regions where auctions were organized grew.  In December 1992, only eight regions Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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organized auctions, yet by April the number expanded to 61 regions, and in October 74 regions.  
Auctions have already been organized in 86 regions of the 88 regions in Russia. 
 
Auctions are organized at the location of the JSC locations, where shares are emitted.  The regions 
with the highest number of auctions are: Saint Petersburg, Wologda, Stavropol, Worone¿, Ivanowo, 
Vladivostok, Kurgan, Kursk, and Mordowia.  Interregional sale appeared for the first time in 
March, and was aimed at securing the interests of small investors in the less industrialized regions.  
These auctions involved only large firms (ZI£, Uralmasz, UAZ).  Experience has shown that 
participation of investors from other regions in the interregional auctions increases the price of the 
share.  At the same time, however, new difficulties arise because of the large differentiation of legal 
conditions between republics constituting the Russian Federation, as well as difficulties with 
transferring property rights, issuing vouchers to new owners, and the circulation of shares and 
vouchers.  Moreover, according to the law issued on February 15, 1993, it is impossible to take part 
in auctions via mail or proxy.  Investors are obliged to arrive at auctions personally, which 
increases the cost of operation and deepens the regional fragmentation of the voucher market. 
 
Another phenomenon, is the oscillation of the voucher exchange rate.  The rate was the highest in 
December 1992, then fell by  more than half in July 1993, only to return to its previous level in 
January 1994.  Up until the end of 1993, there was a paradoxical situation of an inverse proportion 
between the number of shares sold at auctions and the voucher exchange rate:  the lower the 
number of shares designated for voucher auctions, the higher the number of shares one voucher 
could buy, and thus the higher the voucher exchange rate.  While in January 1993, with only eleven 
percent of shares designated for voucher auctions in the second round, one voucher could acquire 
an average of three shares.  When in July 1993, on the other hand, 23 percent of shares were 
designated for the voucher auctions, one voucher could acquire only 1.23 shares.  At the beginning 
of 1994 the situation became more logical showing a positive correlation between the number of 
shares available at auctions and the number of shares which could be acquired by one voucher. 
 
 
THE PURCHASING POWER OF A RUBLE INVESTED IN VOUCHERS 
 
The ruble's purchasing power is calculated by dividing the voucher exchange rate by the market 
price of the voucher.  A cyclical evolution of the purchasing power of rubble invested in purchase 
of voucher is clearly discernible.  For example, in December 1992 it was possible to acquire in 
average 3.25 shares for one voucher, or 3,250 Rb.  of book value assets.  At the same time the 
voucher price amounted to 7,447 Rb.  This means, that for one ruble spend on a purchase of a 
voucher it was possible to buy 44 Russian cents (kopeks) worth of state assets.  Data in a dynamic 
dimension shown in Tab.  11 reveals that, generally speaking, with time the purchasing power of Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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rubles decreases.  In December 1993, one year later, one voucher ruble could acquire only 9 kopeks 
worth of assets, and in February 1994 12 kopeks worth, eight times below the nominal value.  The 
decline of purchasing power of a voucher ruble was a result of two processes: an increase in the 
average price of a voucher and a decline of the voucher exchange rate.   The latter resulted from a 
rise in share prices.  In March 1993, the price of one share with a nominal price of one thousand 
rubles oscillated between 1 thousand and 46 thousand Rb., with an average price of 1,779 rubles.  
In December 1993, the same share oscillated between 250 rubles and 40 thousand rubles with the 
average of 11,690 rubles, an increase of 6 and half times. 
 
TABLE 11.    FORMATION OF THE PURCHASING POWER OF A RUBLE INVESTED IN 







(thou.  Rb.) 
Capital 
sold 










Dec.  '92  7447  3041 513 158 3.25  0.44
Jan.  '93  5027  6062 705 229 3.08  0.61
Feb.  '93  4600   6497 1489 544 2.74  0.60
Mar.  '93  4164  22554 5297 2268 2.34  0.56
Apr.  '93  4284  30038 7016 4217 1.66  0.39
May  '93  5289  23174 7482 3745 1.20  0.23
Jun.  '93  8886  38502 8036 4440 1.81  0.20
Jul.  '93  9088  35205 8180 6668 1.23  0.13
Aug.  '93  9567  33514 6909 4277 1.62  0.17
Sep.  '93  10134  35498 7192 4786 1.50  0.15
Oct.  '93  11648  45142 8407 4635 1.81  0.16
Nov.  '93  28672  46287 8474 2871 2.95  0.10
Dec.  '93  26421  50824 9919 4383 2.26  0.09
Jan.  '94  24762  50234 11456 4091 3.00  0.12
Feb.  '94  22674  60266 14296 4920 2.71  0.12
*  Own calculations based on: Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994) 
 
The fact that, one ruble purchased a mere fraction of the nominal value of shares, had its impact on 
investor behavior.  They preferred to use their rubles either for direct purchase of state assets, which 
was possible during the closed subscriptions in the first round (officially up to 50 percent, but in 
reality 80 percent) or for the purchase of strategic interest during investment tenders in the third 
round.  Vouchers were only used in situations when it was absolutely necessary, such as the Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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voucher auctions or closed subscriptions.  This explains the earlier mentioned paradox of the 
limited utility of vouchers in voucher privatization. 
 
VOUCHER EXCHANGE RATE AND ENTERPRISE SIZE 
 
The voucher exchange rate, illustrating how many shares one voucher can acquire, is a good 
indicator of the attractiveness of a specific investment opportunity. 
 
In Poland, as well as in other post-communist countries conducting privatization on a large scale, a 
rule has developed, that the shares of small enterprises usually achieve a higher price than shares of 
large enterprises.  Large enterprises are associated with low effectiveness, red tape, and a 
production profile very characteristic of socialist enterprises.  How is in this respect in Russia? 
 
TABLE 12.    RESULTS OF VOUCHER AUCTIONS ACCORDING TO FOUNDING CAPITAL 
(Data from March 1, 1994) 
 
Founding 
capital   


















1-2.5  1804   2842  761   26.8%  868  0.88 
2.5-5   1735   6247  1639   26.2%  1399  1.17 
5-10   1732   12315  3075  25.0%  2207  1.39 
10-25  1913   30261  7245   23.9%  5044  1.44 
25-50  891   31602   7680  24.3%  4466  1.72 
50-100  555  38462  8731 22.7%  6485 1.35 
100-250  412   62540   13558  21.7%  8090  1.68 
250-500  156    54286 12009 22.1% 6093  1.97 
500-1000  80  54697  9751 17.8%  4965 1.96 
1000 -   67   194747  38033  19.5%  12649  3.01 
Others  12    627  25 4.0%  10 2.50 
Total   9357   488626  102507  21.0%  52276  1.96 
*  Own calculations based on: Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994). 
 
The exchange rates in different size firms in Table 12 illustrate that 76.7 percent of all enterprises 
designated for privatization are ones with founding capital below 25 million rubles ($25 thousand) 
per firm.  These enterprises also designate a large portion of shares for sale at the voucher auctions. 
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From the same table it is also visible that the smaller the enterprise, the higher the price of its share 
expressed in voucher rubles.  For one voucher in small enterprises with founding capital less than 
2.5 million Rb., it was possible to acquire less than one share (.88 of share).  At the same time, in a 
case of an enterprise with founding capital amounting to more than one billion rubles, it was 
possible to acquire 3 shares for one voucher.  A very similar phenomenon can be seen when the size 
of enterprises is measured by the number of employees.  (See Table 13). 
 
TABLE 13.    RESULTS  OF  VOUCHER  AUCTIONS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF 





















1-499  5497 42,097  10409  24.7%  8441 1.23 
500-999  1308 29,675  6950 23.4%  5014 1.39 
1,000-4,999  1578  118,520  26174 22.1% 15099 1.73 
5,000-9,999 216  73,208  13178  18.0%  6422  2.05 
10,000  -  100  148,578  28635 19.3% 10261 2.79 
Others 658 76,547  17162  22.4%  7040  2.44 
Total   9357  488,625  102508  21.0%  52277  1.96 
*  Own calculations based on: Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994). 
 
Data in Table 13, similarly to that of Table 12, confirms that the larger the enterprise (measured by 
number of employees), the larger the number of shares which can be exchanged for one voucher.  In 
enterprises employing less than 500 employees, for one voucher 1.2 shares can be obtained.  In 
enterprises employing more than 10 thousand employees, one voucher could acquire almost three 
shares.   
 
Small firms with less than 500 employees constitute the largest group (24.7%) among sold 
enterprises.  In second place are firms with 500 to 999 employees (23.4%), and in third place are 
firms employing between 1 and 5 thousand employees (22.1%).  By multiplying the number of 
employees by the number of firms, it is clear that the largest number of employees are employed in 
firms belonging to this last category.   
 
 
 Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
26 
EXCHANGE RATE AND INDUSTRY BRANCH 
 
The next problem requiring analysis was the question of the profitability of investment in different 
branches of industry.  In Table 14 we present data concerning the number of firms privatized in 
different branches, the founding capital of these firms, the number of vouchers designated for the 
purchase of shares in specific branches, as well as the exchange rate existing in all main branches of 
industry.   
 
 
Table    14.      VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION ACCORDING TO BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY 
(Data from March 4, 1994) 
 



















Retail trade  122  1298 0.27% 10.6 26.7% 1551  2.97% 0.22
Computers 48  118 0.02% 2.5 28.4% 77  0.15% 0.44
Spec.  Transport  13   117 0.02% 9.0 26.6% 58  0.11% 0.54
Drainage 7  65 0.01% 9.3 34.7% 41  0.08% 0.55
R&D Centers  346  2460 0.50% 7.1 25.5% 987  1.89% 0.64
Publishing 21  207 0.04% 9.9 22.3% 63  0.12% 0.73
Petrol.  Refin.  10  3374 0.69% 337.4 15.9% 634  1.21% 0.85
Communication 20  1144 0.23% 57.2 26.0% 350  0.67% 0.85
Food, Tobacco  657  14723 3.01% 22.4 22.4% 3698  7.08% 0.89
Furniture 134  1528 0.31% 11.4 24.6% 392  0.75% 0.96
Catering, Hotel  34  5931 1.21% 174.4 32.3% 1480  2.83% 1.29
Second.Smelting 80  604 0.12% 7.6 25.7% 117  0.22% 1.33
Wholesale Trade  594  8944 1.83% 15.1 25.6% 1551  2.97% 1.48
Handicraft 146  1299 0.27% 8.9 24.3% 213  0.41% 1.48
Mining 50  3523 0.72% 70.5 27.0% 640  1.23% 1.49
Water Transport  56  13377 2.74% 238.9 14.5% 1273  2.44% 1.52
Car Sale Repair  179  1731 0.35% 9.7 22.8% 248  0.47% 1.59
Air Transport  8  1031 0.21% 128.9 15.1% 96  0.18% 1.62
Chemicals 956  51961 10.63% 54.4 21.9% 6794  13.01% 1.67
Transportation   963  6751 1.38% 7.0 25.6% 1024  1.96% 1.69
Wood & Paper  690  20323 4.16% 29.5 21.2% 2539  4.86% 1.70
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Service 16  49 0.01% 3.1 27.4% 7  0.01% 1.92
Metallurgy 296  73695 15.08 249.0 22.1% 7654  14.66% 2.13
Sea Food Proc.  33  1579 0.32 47.8 23.7% 167  0.32% 2.24
Car Industry  115  41707 8.54 362.7 30.2% 5432  10.40% 2.32
Elect.  Machine.  1221  84824 17.36 69.5 20.9% 7418  14.20% 2.39
Construction 1480  704 4.85 16.0 22.6% 2087  4.00% 2.57
Forestry 3  54 0.01 18.0 29.0% 6  0.01% 2.61
Iron Forging  8  43 0.01 5.4 24.7% 4  0.01% 2.66
Oil & Gas  6  29235 5.98 4872.5 16.9% 1659  3.18% 2.98
Water Supply  19  290 0.06 55.3 28.1% 24  0.05% 3.40
Light Industry  553  31313 6.41 56.6 23.4% 2067  3.96% 3.54
Power Distribut  49  49731 10.18 1014.9  9.9% 1114  2.13% 4.42
Coal Mining  12  158 0.03 13.2 26.1% 9  0.02% 4.58
Others 337  10876 2.23 32.3 15.2% 649  1.24% 2.55
Total 9357  488626 100% 52.2 21.0% 52227  100% 1.96
*  Own calculations based on: Rezultaty (1994).   
 
The most enterprises to be privatized were selected from construction, electro-machinery, and 
chemical industries and from transport.  Firms from these four branches constituted half (49.3%) of 
the total of privatized JSCs.  The founding capital of the electro-machinery, metallurgy, chemical, 
and energy distribution industries constituted more than half of the capital of all enterprises 
(53.2%).  The largest average capital of firms designated for privatization was in the refinery and 
gas industry, as well as firms from the energy industry; the smallest one from firms in the computer 
industry.   Generally, the demand expressed in the number of invested vouchers and the supply 
expressed in the number of available shares differ tremendously.  The most vouchers were sent for 
the purchase of shares of trade firms, (7,050, of which 1,551 were accepted), followed by the food 
and tobacco industry (4,155 - 3,698 accepted).  The lowest demand was for shares of firms in the 
coal mining industry, iron forging and forestry. 
 
This disproportion between voucher demand and share supply lead to serious disproportions in the 
exchange rate.   The upper part of Table 14 contains branches with exchange rates below the 
average of 1.96 per voucher (more expensive shares).  The lower part of the table contains branches 
with a higher than average exchange rate. 
 Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
28 
In a comparison of all branches, it is visible that the most attractive investments were in retail trade, 
publishing, refinery, the food and tobacco industry, and the hotel industry.  The least attractive were 
coal mining, iron forging, and the automobile industry, in other words all the branches which were 
the pride of the Soviet economy, symbols of its economic power.  The highest price was achieved 
by  retail trade firms, where four and a half vouchers were needed to purchase one share.  In other 
words one share of a trade firm, with a nominal value of one thousand rubles, cost 45,454 voucher 
rubles at voucher auctions.  In second place was the computer industry, where shares were sold for 
22,727 Rb.  each.  The least expensive were shares of coal mines.  Coal mining shares were sold out 
for 2,183 Rb.  per share (1/5 of the nominal price), energy distribution enterprises - 2,262 Rb.  per 
share (1/5), and light industry enterprises - 2,825 Rb.  per share (1/4 of the nominal price).   
 
Many of the sold shares are already listed on Russian stock exchanges.  These exchanges are 
functioning in Russia without any legal regulation and are similar to the Polish commodities 
markets.  Most of them trade commodities in the morning, and  vouchers and other securities in the 
afternoon.  Securities circulating on the market are not licensed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
 
Approximately 60 stock exchanges are currently operating in the Russian Federation.  The largest is 
in Vladivostok, under name Vladivostok International Stock Exchange, where shares of 
approximately 30 firms are listed, mostly freight companies.  The second largest is the Petersburg 
Stock Exchange.  It is estimated that all of the Russian Stock Exchanges have a combined turnover 
of approximately $500 million.  The sale of vouchers is currently the most profitable business. 
 
Shares of enterprises usually gain value when they are traded on the stock exchanges.  For example, 
the shares of SOVAVTO were sold at the vouchers auctions at a relation of one share for one and 
half vouchers i.e.  approximately 9,231 Rb per share.  One month later, these shares were selling for 
20 thousand Rb.  and more on the stock exchanges.  The shares of the refinery industry will 
probably give the voucher holders an even higher capital gain (Bolkin 1993). 
 
Another interesting feature of the Russian exchanges is the temporary character of all listings.  The 
firms shares are listed as long, as long the secondary distribution of shares between investment 
funds takes place.  It usually lasts a few months, when funds set up their portfolios according to 
branch criteria (no anti-cartel law is imposed).  After the portfolios are completed, shares are no 
longer exchanged or listed.  Generally speaking, it can be said that stock exchanges in Russia are 
arenas where investment funds are trying to get control over privatized enterprises.  Capital gain 
plays a marginal role (Klebnikov, 1994). 
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM VOUCHER AUCTIONS 
 
Vouchers auctions, according to the expectations of the architects of the Russian VPP, had to 
provide the mechanism of share distribution among voucher holders.  They should secure free 
access to the privatization process and at the same time ensure the broad distribution of state assets 
among the population.  Were these expectations fulfilled? 
  
From the management and employee point of view, the voucher auctions are the least tolerated 
solution.  Thus they use different methods and tricks to avoid voucher auctions, which would make 
them lose control over the shares sold to external investors. 
 
The voucher auctions are also unattractive to potential investors.  The small purchasing power of a 
ruble invested in the purchase of vouchers causes the investors to prefer making purchases for cash 
either within the closed subscriptions or in the third round i.e.  through investment tenders or 
auctions.  Each ruble spent this way acquires twice as much asset value, than shares purchased for 
vouchers during voucher auctions.  Vouchers are attractive only in situations when shares for 
external investors can be purchased only though voucher auctions.  This most likely decides the 
high price of vouchers on secondary markets. 
 
The third lesson learned from the functioning of the voucher auctions is that small enterprises are 
more attractive investment targets than large ones.  The shares of small firms are on average 
approximately three times as expensive as shares of large firms.  This seems to illustrate that 
Russian investors are fast learners.  If in the first quarter of 1993 these investors preferred to 
purchase shares of large firms because of their size and reputation, than by the end of 1993, they 
apparently preferred small firms, less known to the public, but at the same time more efficient and 
more controllable. 
 
The fourth lesson learned, especially apparent at the Moscow voucher auctions, is that the price of 
the shares depends primarily on one factor, regarded as the main advantage of the firms.  In 
Moscow, such an advantage is location.  If an enterprise is located in the center, meaning within the 
Garden's Ring (Sadovyje Kolco), then the price of the shares will increase to a high level.  For 
example, in the case of the JSC SZKOM located downtown, one voucher with a nominal value of 
10 thousand rubles and a market price of approximately 7,000 Rb., could only acquire 90 Rb.  
worth of shares; in the case of the JSC TECHNOSTROJPROM - 30 Rb., and in the JSC NIIZ - 8 
Rb.   
 
The main advantage of a firm does not have to be location.  Another factor which can be important, 
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tobacco industry, aluminum industry, or energy industry are more valuable, than those in 
construction or coal mining.  For instance, on the stock exchange in Volgograd, the demand for 
shares of the brewery industry caused price of the JSC PIVOVAR to soar to the level of three one 
hundred Rb.  shares for one voucher (ca 33.3 Thousand Rb.).  At the same time, the shares of a 
construction company KAMYSZINPROM¯ILSTROJ (well-rated by specialists) reached the price 
of 35 shares for one voucher (ca.  200 Rb.  per share), or 117 times less than the shares of the 
brewery industry.  Other factors, such as the degree of equipment obsolescence, profitability, and 
management experience play a secondary role (Krizis 1993). 
 
The fifth conclusion which can be drawn from voucher privatization in Russia relates to the 
situation during auctions.  The lower the number of small investors in relation to all auction 
participants, the lower the voucher exchange rate, and the higher the price of the shares.  Examples 
of record prices appear to confirm this.  For example in the JSC NIIZ (one share  - 87,500 Rb) of 
the 35,122 vouchers sent to the auction, small (investing less than 50 vouchers) investors 
successfully placed only 691 vouchers, or less than 2 percent of all vouchers.  In the JSC 
ROSSZTERN small investors successfully invested 714 of the 62,187 vouchers (1.15%); in the JSC 
TECHNOSTROJPROM (one share - 23,333 Rb) only 310 of the 13,009 vouchers (2.38%).   
Conversely, everywhere where small investors constituted a large portion of the bidders, the prices 
of shares were much smaller.  For example, in the JSC WNIPP 49.53 percent of the vouchers were 
invested by small investors, and the price was 6.5 thousand Rb.  per share;  in the JSC 
NITERCHLSDTORG 25.56 percent were invested by small investors and the price was 1,650 Rb.;  
and finally in the case of the JSC MOSPIEC¯ELEZOBETON, 22.02 percent resulted in a  price of 
3,600 Rb.  per share.  There was only one case, with the sale of the JSC MKTB, where one large 
investor invested 3 thousand vouchers, with small investors having investing only 65 (2.12%), and 
the share price was still only 1,375 Rb.  In this case, however, the employees constituted the 
majority, and were responsible for such a low price (Bolkin 1993). 
 
There are a few possible explanations for this phenomenon.  Large investors seemed to be more 
committed to some firms, which they thought are more profitable than others, and therefore were 
willing to pay higher prices.  They were more successful in blocking small investors from biding for 
the more attractive shares.  Furthermore, the mechanism for determining the striking price prefers 
type 1 bidders, who do not specify the number of shares they want to buy and who accept any 
striking price.  For large investors (those investing more than 50 vouchers) it was easier to pay 85 
vouchers for one share in the JSC NIIZ, than it was for small investors, who tended to state more 
specific bid prices (number of shares per voucher).  These bidders, when bidding below the striking 
price do not receive shares.  The entire bidding process, therefore, supports large bidders. 
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The sixth lesson is that voucher privatization and the monopolistic position of employees and 
managers lead to low prices of sold enterprises.  In spite of the fact that prices of shares are 
growing, these enterprises are, for the most part, practically given away.  For example, in the 
Sajansk Aliuminiejnyj Zavod, the assets, based on the book value method, were valued at 1.2 
billion Rb.   Shares at the voucher auction were sold at the rate of three shares for one voucher.  The 
voucher price was at that time approximately 6 thousand Rb., which means that each share's price 
was 2 thousand Rb.  This also means that the market value of the JSC was 2.4 billion Rb., or twice 
as much as the official book value.  By the official exchange rate at the time, it amounted to 
approximately $2.4 million, the price of small airplane on western markets.  There is no doubt that 
the investors purchasing this enterprises can expect a high capital gain in the future.  Moreover, the 
hydro-electrical energy used in the JSC Sajansk Aliuminiejnyj Zavod is very inexpensive, further 
adding to the attractiveness of the firm. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE VPP 
 
An important role in the Russian VP Program was played by the Voucher Funds (VFs).  The law 
allows two types of investment funds: a.) special privatization investment funds, intended to 
accumulate vouchers (voucher Funds), licensed and regulated by the GKI and local committees, and 
b.) other Investment Funds (IF) intended to accumulate financial means, licensed and regulated by 
the Ministry of Finance. 
 
In this paper the focus is placed only on the first type of funds.  The assumption is made that the 
VFs, acting as large investors, are better able than most citizens to obtain information on 
companies, and therefore secure better returns in the long term.   
 
Voucher funds are closed-end funds organized as JSCs.  This means that shareholders cannot 
demand that the fund redeem  (buy back) their shares., but the Fund shares must be tradable. 
 
The requirements for establishing a VF were relatively easy to meet, allowing any citizen or 
institution the opportunity to establish one.  Funds are required by law to have a minimum starting 
capital of 500 thousand rubles divided into 500 shares of 1,000 rubles each.  This capital could be 
contributed either in the form of financial means or in kind, but it cannot be contributed in the form 
of vouchers.  Moreover the founding capital has to be deposited by the shareholders within 30 days 
of the registration of the fund.  They could operate either as classical funds or as voucher funds 
which do not operate with liquid financial assets, but only with privatization vouchers.  Investment 
funds were created by domestic banks, private consulting firms, and by some privatized enterprises. 
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The equity of these funds constituted the shares of the firms acquired by the fund for investment 
points.  A rule of diversification was enacted requiring that VF invest in at least 10 firms and that 
their investment not surpass 10 percent of the capital of any JSC (this has been increased in the 
second half of 1993 to 30 percent).  VFs additionally were not allowed to invest more than five 
percent of their assets in any single JSC, and acquire or own 15 percent of any issuer's debt 
instruments.  Additionally funds may not buy, sell or invest in securities or other assets of any 
subsidiary, borrow money or issue debt obligations, invest in securities issued by manager, invest in 
debt securities other than government securities, buy options or make futures contracts etc.  The 
investment restriction were modeled after the U.S. investment fund model. 
 
To protect the investor, funds as well as fund managers must be licensed by the GKI, and fund 
managers must have trained employees. 
 
The funds are managed according to Western practices.  Each fund is regulated by a Charter of 
Voucher Fund.  The board of each fund appoints a separate fund manager for each JSC.  An 
agreement with the manager has to be concluded.  The manager or any affiliate of the manager must 
not constitute a majority on the board or directors of the fund.  Total payment to the manager, 
including all fees and expenses, must not exceed 10 percent of the value of the assets of the fund in 
any one year.  The fund must appoint a depository (a bank or other legal entity) to handle cash and 
securities including vouchers.  The depository must not be an affiliate of the fund with whom the 
fund closes an agreement.  Each voucher fund has to issue a prospectus and its credibility has to be 
evaluated by an independent auditor.  The auditor also checks the accounts of the depository and 
manager. 
 
The role of the fund is to make profit for investors by buying JSC shares at special voucher 
auctions, by investing directly in shares, through the secondary market (stock exchanges and OTCs) 
and/or by trading in vouchers - accumulating them and selling them on to investors.  Funds make 
profits for their shareholders in three ways: by accumulating dividends paid to them out of the 
annual profits of JSCs whose shares they own, by selling shares of the companies, and by selling 
vouchers at a price higher than their purchase price. 
 
At the same time, the government is also encouraging the establishment of private venture capital 
companies.  These companies use their own financial resources to purchase vouchers from the 
population for the purpose of acquiring shares of privatized JSCs.  In this case, the companies aim 
at exercising control and management.  No data is available on investment funds and venture capital 
companies.  Observation indicates that the second type is more popular than the first one, but both 
investment companies and venture capital companies are actively taking part in the purchase of 




DEVELOPMENT OF VOUCHER INVESTMENT FUNDS 
 
The number of investment funds has rapidly increased.  The first three were established in Saint 
Petersburg in November 1992.  On February 1, 1993, there were already 300 funds (Wauczer 
1993), and in June 1993 more than 450 (Chubais, Vishnevskaja 1993).  At the moment (March 
1994) 600 funds are officially registered, of which approximately 75 percent are active.   
Approximately one sixth of the funds are registered in the Federal GKI, and the remainder in the 
local branches of the GKI.  The license given by the GKI provides a guarantee for the credibility of 
the funds, a guarantee which is very needed, as these funds have a very small founding capital.  Of 
the 600 funds registered by the GKI, a mere 60 funds had founding capital exceeding 50 million Rb.  
(5 thousand USD). 
  
Table 15 presents the number of voucher funds, as well as the number of vouchers being under the 
control of the funds, and the number of deposited vouchers in different regions of the Russian 
Federation.  In this table, only the vouchers which took part in voucher auctions are shown.  Those 
vouchers which were used in the closed subscriptions are not included, due to the fact that 
investment founds could not participate in these subscriptions. 
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TABLE 15.  VOUCHERS DEPOSITED IN FUNDS AND SHARES OF VOUCHER FUNDS (in 




































Northern 6191.1  2783.9  22 759.1 12.3% 647.7 23.3%  282.3 2.3
N. West.  8270.4  6384.8  26 1367.4 16.5% 941.7 14.7%  355.9 2.6
Central    30383.3  11901.9  102 16294.0 53.6% 9016.5 75.8%  7102.2 1.3
V. Vyatka  8482.6  2980.4  16 598.8 7.1% 463.3 15.5%  255.1 1.8
C. Chern.  7761.9  1783.6  22 680.8 8.8% 590.6 33.1%  320.9 1.8
Volga    16640.9  5185.3  54 1340.4 8.1% 552.9 10.7%  369.4 1.5
N. Cauc.  17245.6  3117.1  42 1756.9 10.2% 1142.6 36.7%  1087.0 1.1
Ural 20430.5  8523.1  63 3901.1 19.1% 2606.5 30.6%  2104.5 1.2
W. Siber.  16888.5  5603.6  47 2290.3 13.6% 1298.7 23.2%  1256.4 1.0
E.  Siber.  9474.8  2349.5  30 1269.9 13.4% 994.1 42.3%  815.4 1.2
Far East  8445.6  1448.3  23 1095.5 13.0% 891.2 61.5%  522.9 1.7
Kalinin. 894.1  215.1  1 6.9 0.8% 4.0 1.9%  3.3 1.2
Total 151109.3  52276.5  448 31361.0 20.8% 19149.9 36.6%  14475.3 1.3
*  Own calculations based on: Uchastie (1994), Summarnaja (1994) and Rezultaty (1994). 
 
The largest number of funds and largest number of vouchers are concentrated in the Central region, 
which includes Moscow, Smolensk, Briansk, Tver and Tula.  This region contains one fourth of all 
voucher funds, and half of the vouchers accumulated in funds.  53 percent of all issued vouchers are 
in this region's voucher funds.  Some of these funds are becoming very large.  For example, the 
Moscow Voucher Investment Fund accumulated seven million  vouchers (Rossijskaja Gazieta, 
13.02.93).  Moscow is gradually becoming the financial center of the Russian Federation, which 
explains such a large accumulation of funds and vouchers in one region. 
 
Similarly, the Central region has displayed the highest propensity to invest.  Funds in this region 
have invested 75 percent of all accumulated vouchers.  Also active were the Far East region with 61 
percent of all accumulated vouchers invested, and the East Siberian region with 42.3% of all 
accumulated vouchers invested.  Generally, funds seem to be more active in regions less populated, 
where individual investors are less interested in decision making. 
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At the same time, however, both the Siberian and Far East regions are characterized by a small 
number of shares sold within the framework of voucher auctions and a large number of shares 
distributed through closed subscriptions (First Round).  This seems to indicate the employee's 
strong identification with their own firms and their attempt at taking control of these firms.  The 
lower interest of external investors in firms operating in these regions (great distance to the center 
of Russia) also contributes to this process.  The small number of funds and small propensity to 
invest is also characteristic of the Kaliningrad region.  In this region, small privatization is being 
introduced very effectively.  The privatization of large enterprises is left to its own devices. 
 
Another characteristic phenomenon is the relatively small concentration of capital in the hands of 
individual investors, measured by the relation of accumulated capital to the number of shareholders.  
On average, one shareholder invested 2.16 vouchers in the fund.  This seems to undermine the 
thesis about the high concentration of capital by a few owners. 
 
It is also apparent from Table 15 that the investment funds reveal a higher propensity to invest than 
individual voucher holders.  Having 20.8 percent of all vouchers, funds have acquired 36.6 percent 
of all shares designated for sale within the framework of the voucher auctions.  At the same time, 




EXPERIENCES FROM THE FUNCTIONING OF THE VOUCHER FUNDS 
 
The over one year functioning of the funds allows us to perform general observations and 
evaluations. 
 
The first observation pertains to the investment strategy of the investment funds.  These funds 
generally specialize in selected branches of industry.  For example, one of the largest funds, the 
First Voucher Fund, administering 4.5 million vouchers, specializes in investments in hotel 
management, artificial fertilizer, precious metals, and the jewelry industry.  Up until the end of 
1993, this fund has purchased shares of 80 enterprises in these branches.  Another example is 
provided by the Moscow-based Alfa Capital, established in December 1992.  By the end of 1993, 
Alfa Capital administered an investment portfolio containing 2.5 million vouchers with a market 
value of 60 billion rubles ($40 million).  Alfa Capital invested in 46 enterprises specializing in food 
processing and production of building materials. 
 
A second interesting phenomenon is that the funds are most often acquiring shares in a manner not 
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but represent a reason for pride in one's entrepreneurship.  One of the fund managers was bragging 
to the authors that he had smuggled 60 diskettes with information on the financial situations of 
firms from the State Committee.  This allowed the fund to chose the most profitable enterprises.  
Another specific characteristic is that transactions very often bypass the law.  For example, Mikhail 
Czebotarev, the head of the First Voucher Investment Fund, purchased 25 percent of the shares of 
the Cosmos hotel, built for the Olympics in Moscow.  To purchase these shares, he bribed the 
representatives of the Privatization Fund to hold the tender in only two places in Moscow, rather 
than on the territory of the entire Russian Federation.  Next, he bribed the managers of two other 
investment funds not to participate in the tender.  At the same time he gave an interview on 
television in which he discussed the low attractiveness of investing in the hotel industry due to the 
bad condition of hotels in Russia (Klebnikov, 1994).  The same manager told Forbes how he bought 
shares in the Solikam Paper Factory.  First, together with the enterprise manager he convinced the 
authorities of the Privatization Fund that the tender must take place at the plant site.  The plant, 
however, is located on the territory of another plant producing arms and thus is closed to outside 
visitors.  Only the representatives of the First Fund received free access to the territory of the plant, 
and thus First Fund purchased 10 percent of the shares in a factory which has an annual production 
of 200 million USD (Klebnikov, 1994). 
 
A third phenomenon is a lack of control by shareholders and investment funds over the activities of 
enterprises, the shares of which comprise the investment portfolio.  This is very often a result of 
considerable dispersion (diversifying the portfolio) which causes a large number of funds to 
administer a small number of shares.  This strategy is undoubtedly effective in developed capital 
markets, yet it does not pass the test in the case of privatizing enterprises in Russia.  Even if a fund 
purchases a controlling block of shares of some enterprise, it does not mean that it will be able to 
control the management of that enterprise.  Most Russian managers feel that outside shareholders 
do not introduce any new values to the enterprise (vouchers are not money), and these outside 
investors are perceived as intruders invading their sphere of authority.  From this point of view 
privatization is like a hostile takeover.  Some enterprises do not disclose information on the 
financial situation to the formal owners, nor a list of shareholders.  A good example is provided by 
BOLSZEWIK, a cookie factory privatized as one of the first, back in December 1992.  Alfa Capital 
acquired 25 percent of the shares, but the management did not allow representatives of Alfa to vote 
at the annual shareholders meeting.  In reply, Alfa filed a lawsuit against the management of 
BOLSZEWIK, but the judges dismissed the case citing a lack of experience in dealing with similar 
complaints.  In response, Alfa began a campaign in the press pointing out the corruption activities 
of the main manager of the firm, and convinced the State Committee to threaten the manager with 
dismissal.  Nothing, however, provided the desired results.  It was only when Alfa, together with 
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modernizing the plant, were Alfa representatives allowed to participate in the meeting of the Board 
of Directors of the BOLSZEWIK company. 
 
A fourth phenomenon is the high risk involved in investing in the investment funds.  A low 
capitalization of the investment funds greatly increases the risk associated with investment in the 
shares of the fund.  The first Russian cases of fraud, similar to the Grobelny case in Poland, have 
already become known.  The AMARIS company, registered for a symbolic 10 thousand rubles (ca.  
$20) was giving high interest on vouchers and personal cash deposits.  The scheme was simple.  For 
one voucher given to the disposal of the company, it paid 12 thousand rubles (or twice the market 
value of the voucher).  The voucher could be withdrawn at the first request of the owner.  In the 
first months, AMARIS met its obligations.  The attractive conditions of the voucher lending caused 
a rapid influx of customers.  In the beginning of February, however, AMARIS closed all its offices 
and disappeared without a trace along with 3 billion rubles worth of vouchers, or about 5 million 
USD (using the exchange rate at the time).  A similar situation occurred with the Techniczeskij 
Progress fund.  This fund promised 500 percent return on invested capital.  In this manner it enticed 
around 300,000 small investors.  It subsequently disappeared.  Many of the funds working on the 
market do not have formal licenses awarded by the State Committee. 
 
A fifth phenomenon is the unethical advertising by the funds in an attempt to lure potential 
customers to purchase the fund's shares.  For example, the voucher fund "Neft-Almaz-Invest" 
announced that it will pay 750 percent dividend on deposited capital in the form of vouchers.  The 
fund unfortunately did not inform the viewers that it will pay out the 750 percent only to the 
founding members of the fund, which established the fund in 1992, and not to the persons which 
have subsequently bought shares in the fund. 
Another trick was used by the First Voucher Fund.  It announced that the value of its shares has 
increased tenfold.  The real value, however, did not increase, but was rather raised administratively 
by the fund management.  If at the beginning, January and February 1993, the First Fund offered 10 
of its shares for one voucher, then in December it only offered one of its share per voucher.  In this 
manner, the value of the First Fund increased tenfold (Pribalow, Nikolajev, Kaliszczenko, Fadiejev, 
1994). 
 
A sixth phenomenon is the uncontrollability of the funds.  According to the Presidential Decree no.  
1186, funds are to organize annual shareholders meetings, at which decisions regarding the division 
of profits are to be made.  It is also mandatory to maintain a quorum, such as that at least half the 
shareholders are to be present at the meeting.  These regulations, however, are impossible to 
enforce.  For example, it is impossible to hold a general meeting of the First Voucher Fund, as it has 
over three million shareholders, and there is not a conference hall that size, not to mention the costs 
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problem.  Certain funds (i.e.  Moskowskij Investicionnyj Fond) organize regional shareholder 
meetings, in their place of residence.  There appears, however, the problem of ensuring unity in the 
decisions of the meetings.  Other funds have written meetings; shareholders vote by choosing the 
desired option of a resolution.  Still other funds allow representatives to vote and participate in 
meetings, only after they have presented notarized certification by the owner of the shares.  This, 
though, is rather difficult as notary services are little known and expensive.  Some funds decide not 
to hold meetings at all.  In such instances, the activities of the fund management are practically 
uncontrolled.  This certainly has its effect on the payment of dividends. 
 
The reluctance of funds to pay dividends in cash is practically proverbial.  The most often used 
evasion is the payment of dividends with additional shares of their own funds.  This means that the 
fund is issuing additional shares which they use to pay their current shareholders.  Another 
frequently used evasion is the payment of dividends with "nielikwids", which in Russian are shares 
of companies in the fund portfolio which are in a difficult financial situation.  The basic problem 
arising here is that the shares are not equal, and one person can get a share of a relatively profitable 
company, and another of a bankrupt company.  As a result, certain funds have created small fund 
portfolios, comprised of shares of many enterprises in poor financial situation, and have kept 50 % 
of the shares of such portfolios, while dividing up the remaining shares between holders of the fund 
shares as payment of dividends.  In this manner the funds on the one hand clean their investment 
portfolios, and on the other, at a relatively low cost, avoid paying the dividend in cash. 
 
Another evasion has been utilized by the WPIK fund.  This fund announced that the shareholders 
who have invested their voucher on the first day of the fund's existence will receive a 750 percent 
dividend payment, the ones who have invested during the first month will receive a 100 percent 
dividend payment, and the remaining shareholders will receive a 20 percent dividend.  The 
problem, however, lies in the fact that during the first period, potential investors refrained from 
investing, and in effect 99 percent of the shareholders fall into the category "remaining", which 
receive only a 20 percent dividend payment.  In this instance, that 20 percent amounts to 500 rubles 
(33 cents), slightly more than the price of a mail stamp. 
 
 




The success of the Voucher Privatization Program can be evaluated in two different stages: the 
stage of voucher distribution and the stage when new share holders take over new responsibilities. 
In the first stage, the main question focuses on the efficiency of the share distribution mechanism.  
In the second stage, the main question pertains to the efficiency of the newly privatized firms. 
 
This paper focuses only on the first question.  The analysis seems to support the authors' opinion 
that, although the VP Program designers did not succeed in preparing the number of shares to equal 
the number of issued vouchers, they did succeed in implementing a fully "market conformed" 
distribution mechanism. This mechanism compensates for the shortage of shares. As a result, the 
distribution of vouchers is proceeding faster than was expected by the GKI, and its progress so far 
can be considered a success. 
 
The goal of the program, to privatize approximately 5 thousand large enterprises in 1993 was 
surpassed.  During this time 8,010 enterprises have been privatized (until March 1994 - 9,342).  
Total employment in the privatized firms amounts to 9.1 million people, which constitutes about 
45% of total employment in industry.  For comparison, during the same time 80 large firms have 
been privatized in Poland (within the framework of capital privatization), and about 140 firms in 
Hungary. 
 
This success is even more exceptional taking into account that it was achieved with considerable 
opposition from the management and crews of the privatized enterprises.  It would appear that the 
privatization should be attractive for crews and management, as it provides an increase in the 
effectiveness of the enterprise, higher wages, and an increase in production efficiency.  In reality 
the situation is different.  Privatization for managers and crews signifies a transfer of the 
responsibility onto them, which in turn increases the danger of losing government subsidies, and on 
the other hand threatens current firm managers with a loss of employment. 
 
With the current system of selecting enterprises for privatization, industrial branches are organized 
into three main categories.  The first category contains those enterprises which for various reasons 
will never be privatized.  These include some municipal firms, the Central Bank of Russia, 
cemeteries, etc.  The second category contains enterprises which must be privatized.  It includes 
such enterprises as hotels, agricultural processing enterprises, etc.  The third category encompasses 
these enterprises which can be privatized by a decision of the Council of Ministers.  This last 
category also includes enterprises in the refinery and defense industries. 
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The strategy of the managers of most enterprises is based upon attempts to be included in the third 
group.  In practice this is not difficult, as most Russian enterprises are involved in defense industry 
production, and being classified as defense industry firms is a matter of accepted procedure.  On the 
other hand, part of the managers want to wait out the voucher privatization by extending the process 
of establishing the value of the enterprise, and prolonging the procedural activities, etc.  If they can 
do this until July 1, 1994, then the enterprises are shifted to the direct sale method, similar to the 
Polish capital privatization method.  At that point, the privatization process can be dragged out for 
the next couple, if not tens, of years. 
 
Next, there is the question whether what is taking place in the Russian Federation is truly 
privatization?  Grigory Jawlinsky, author of the Gorbaczov "Reforms in 500 days" program, and 
currently the leader of a small pro-reform party in the parliament has said about the Voucher 
Privatization Program: 
 
"What's happened so far is not privatization, it's collectivization, which puts the workers and 
managers in charge of enterprises.  Their interest in increasing wages, not investment.  This 
is a new problem created by this style of privatization." (Russian Privatization, 1994:58) 
 
It is difficult to argue with this statement.  Managers and employees of enterprises are in reality 
becoming the owners of the enterprises.  As Boycko, Shliefer, and Vishny write (1994), managers 
and employees are taking possession of over 70% of ownership in privatizing enterprises.   
Officially it would appear that the voucher privatization system creates sufficient safeguards against 
this process, but reality proves more capable than the most thought-out system. 
 
In the first round of privatization, the most often chosen privatization variant is variant II.  Of the 
7,617 enterprises, 5,881 (77.2%) of them have chosen this variant of privatization, which gives 
employees and management the right to purchase 51 percent of the shares.  The second most 
popular choice is variant I (1,625 - 21.3%) in which the crew receives 25 percent of the shares for 
free, and can purchase, along with management, another 15 percent of the shares.  This gives the 
crew a total of 40 percent of the shares and a 16.6 percent block of controlling shares. 
 
In the second round, in which 29 percent of the shares, according to the assumptions of the 
program, are to be transferred to voucher tenders, a large portion of these shares is bought out by 
employees and management of the enterprises in the tenders.  Recently, a lot of attention has been 
given to the case of the Gorki automobile plant (GAZ) in Nizny Novgrod, the largest plant of this 
kind in Europe.  The managers of the plant were successful in blocking any privatization activities 
in 1992 and the first half of 1993.  In the autumn of 1993, they suddenly expressed interest in the 
privatization process and began vigorous preparatory activities.  As was later revealed, the Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w & Abramow    Voucher Privatization in Russia 
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managers took a high government credit for investment, and used the money to purchase their 
shares for 46 billion rubles ($27 million).  These shares became the property of the enterprise and 
simultaneously enabled the existing management to maintain control.  "The example of the GAZ 
plant is unfortunately typical" said A.  Czubajs, the Chairman of the State Committee (Pragmatic, 
1994).  Transactions of this kind are a daily occurrence and it was only the political conflict 
between governor Niemcov from Nizny Novgrod and the GAZ management which forced the case 
out into the open and caused the entire transaction to be nullified. 
 
In the third round, during the tender, there is the sale of shares (20% according to program 
assumptions) for cash.  The buyers of these shares are firms or persons which present the best 
investment program for the enterprise and offer an intention of investment in executing this 
program.  In many cases, the winners of these tenders are firms which are comprised of 
management or employees, who due to their knowledge of the prevailing conditions in the firms, 
are able to present the best programs and thus win the tender.  This is not to mention that very often 
representatives of the management are on the commissions which decide the choice of the investor, 
or that up until now there have been no organs capable of controlling the execution of the promises 
put forth by the strategic investors. 
 
The end effect is such that the management and crews, due to closed subscriptions, controlled sales 
of shares at the voucher tenders, as well as controlled sales of shares at the investment tenders, are 
taking control of privatized enterprises.  Expanded family clans are being created, and firms are 
more reminiscent of social enterprises from the Yugoslav self-government experiment. 
 
With the aim of preventing or obstructing this process of concentration of power by the 
management of enterprises, on January 1, 1994, President Yeltsin introduced, by a decree, a number 
of limitations which hindered the influence of management on the ownership structure of the 
enterprises.  First of all, intra-enterprise restrictions on selling shares to outside investors were 
forbidden.  Many managers introduced such restriction to prevent the employees from selling shares 
to third parties.  Secondly, a principle was introduced which stated that share-holding employees 
cannot constitute more than one-third of the board of directors, which, in case of more than 10 
thousand shareholders, must be made up of at least 9 members.  And thirdly, another principle was 
introduced which stated that the management must call meetings of the board of directors at least 
once a month. 
 
The most surprising fact, however, is that the anticipations of the reformers that the privatized 
enterprises will become advocates of a market economy, in economic reality also proved to be 
unwarranted.  The management of the newly privatized enterprises, in an attempt to save their own 
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management in its existing composition, it usually promises not to reduce employment, refrain from 
restructuring, and not to limit production.  The existence of an enterprise in this condition can only 
be possible by acquiring additional subsidies from state institutions, such as ministries, associations, 
etc.  This leads to an expansion of these institutions, to a revival of the role of branch ministries and 
economic associations at the expense of functional ministries, and particularly the State Committee.  
Branch ministries are significantly gaining importance in the last government of Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin.  Paradoxically, privatization creates additional pressure to maintain the old 
hierarchic structures of managing the economy. 
 
The management of newly privatized enterprises do not have a chance of surviving in a situation of 
strong outside competition.  As a consequence, strong pressure has appeared from the privatized 
enterprises to introduce a monopoly for foreign trade, to increase import duties or to introduce 
import barriers or quotas. 
 
Newly privatized enterprises are also fearful of internal competition.  As a result, there have 
appeared concepts of creating "integrated financial industrial complexes" converging enterprises in 
the same branch.  This illustrates how alive the unifying concept of GAZPROM, from which Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin originates, is a model for such solutions. 
 
Voucher privatization ends on June 30, 1994.  What happens then?  Currently there is heated debate 
in the Russian Federation government over the concept for further privatization activities.   
Opponents of privatization want to suspend the process for three years and give the Russian Federal 
Property Funds rights to control the execution of investment pledges by strategic investors, which 
have won the investment tenders.  During these three years, these Funds could not only void buying 
and selling transactions and in doing so take back ownership rights from those investors which have 
not implemented the pledges, but also could manage that portion of the shares which would still be 
in their possession.  Thus this would revitalize the concept of holdings, organized regionally.   
Therefore this is a peculiar return to the concept of the Sovnarchoz put forth by N.  Khrushchev in 
1958. 
 
The advocates of rapid privatization in the State Committee, on the other hand, feel that the idea of 
investment tenders where the winner is the one who presents the best investment program and not 
the one who offers the highest price, should be abandoned.  They argue that the preparation of a 
good business plan takes many months, and its realization is nonetheless dependent on the current 
economic conditions.  Furthermore, this creates a possibility of fraud, and other than business-like 
behavior.  They are proponents of introducing auctions, at which the shares would be sold to the 
investor who offered the highest price.  In the course of three days that investor would become the 
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social conditions which this investor would have to meet would be limited only to securing places 
of employment for one year, establishing the conditions for paying off the obligations of the 
enterprise to banks and other institutions, as well as signing an agreement with the company to 
realize those investments which the investor has obliged himself to perform.  The assumptions of 
the new program are included in the document prepared by the State Committee entitled 
"Instruction on the investment tender regarding the sale of blocks of shares in companies."  This 
document is awaiting the approval of the Council of Ministers. 
 
Which option will win?  It is unknown at this point.  Or maybe, as has been the case in the Russian 
privatization program so far, both options will be realized simultaneously? 
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